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SECTION 1

A. Introduction
A lot of recent media attention and an enormous amount of
taxpayer dollars have been focused on issues surrounding cyber
security. Problems arise because many people mean many different
things in referring to cyber security, and different groups have
different, often conflicting or even mutually contradictory goals, in
pursuing such policy. Some companies and users privilege security;
the government places a premium on surveillance, and users vary in
their concerns regarding privacy, often not fully understanding the
relationship between personal and technical aspects of the term.
Much of the debate around cyber security has generated more
heat than light, especially in the wake of the Snowden revelations,
often because those who know a lot about the technical aspects of
cyber issue know little and care less about government concerns,
while those in the policy arena are often willfully unaware of the
technical aspects of the domain they are expected to regulate.
Everyone can agree that no one wants a foreign country to infiltrate
their infrastructure or compromise their financial, transportation,
medical, utility or nuclear weapons systems. And everyone agrees that
cyber-crime and exploitation are common problems that need to be
addressed. But very few know how to go about it.
Many of the discussions around cyber security seem to go
around in circles with very little forward progress, in part because the
decision-making that generates such policy remains poorly informed
and systemically hindered. Here we hope to begin to improve
decision-making by providing a theoretical rubric for understanding
the underlying factors that influence decision-making across different
levels and fields of discipline. In addition, we hope to highlight some
of the inherent difficulties in developing successful policy within each
step and between areas of inquiry. We then offer a research agenda to
guide research into improving decision-making going forward.
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1. Levels of Analysis.
By the term ‘cyber security policy’, we refer to policy
interventions that coordinate and direct resources toward improving
cyber security. Improving cyber security involves protecting
computer networks and systems and the users of these technologies
(including people and organizations) against physical and financial
loss. Decision-making contributes to the formulation of policy
interventions at four levels: international, national, organizational,
and individual.
Interventions differ across levels. For instance, treaties or
agreements are used at the international level, laws and regulation at
the national level, and internal policies or codes of conduct at the
organizational level.

[Table 1 on following page]

32

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Dean & McDermott

5:1

Table 1: A conceptual framework for cyber security policy decisionmaking
Level

Entities

International

Nation state,
international
fora and
organizations

National

National
government,
legislative or
executive
branch
Private
enterprise or
governmental
administrative
agency

Organizational

Individual

Individual
person

Factors
influencing
decision making
Lack of
institutional
structure for nonstate actors
Diffusion of
power
No enforcement
mechanism
Rigidity
No national
strategy
Dispersed
responsibility

Common
policy
interventions
Agreements
Treaties

Lack of evidence
base
Rigidity
Lack of technical
knowledge
Lack of
coordination and
communication
between technical
experts and
policymakers
Loss aversion
Uncertainty/infor
mation asymmetry

Company
policy
Code of
conduct
Contracts

33

Law
Regulation

Heuristics
Hacker
culture
Decision
making
norms
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At an international level, the system for mediating relations
between nation states is not built in a way that allows for inclusion of
non-state actors, which are inherent to any issue connected to digital
technologies and the Internet. This, coupled with the dispersion of
power among states, individuals and non-state actors, makes
enforcement of international treaties or agreements difficult, even if
they are agreed upon and enacted.
At a national level, the lack of national strategy and dispersed
responsibilities for cyber security policy lead to contradictory policy
proposals and unintended consequences that ultimately reduce
overall cyber security. There is often a lack of communication and
integration between the public and private sector, both of which
operate in this space simultaneously. In addition, governments and
technology firms may have entirely antagonistic goals in certain areas,
including those involving privacy, security and surveillance, as the
confrontation between the FBI and Apple over unlocking the San
Bernadino shooter’s iPhone so richly illustrates.
At an organizational level, deficiencies in the information or
evidence base with which to make decisions mean that ‘good’
programs are not identified and ‘bad’ ones are not eliminated. This
problem is coupled with, and compounded by, a chronic lack of
technical knowledge in those organizations with responsibility to
respond to cyber security matters, and a simultaneous lack of
understanding of policy needs and processes within the technical
community.
At an individual level, loss aversion in a situation that is
inherently uncertain systematically restricts optimal decision making
by encouraging individual leaders to revert to automatic and natural
psychological strategies and procedures in decision-making. These
strategies and procedures may not be well suited for the complex
problems or challenges they confront. Risk can be mitigated through
processes, such as insurance, in ways that uncertainty cannot.
Uncertainty tends to make people more cautious, especially in the
wake of potential catastrophic failure; this puts defenders at a
disadvantage relative to attackers.
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The decision-making by entities at each of these four levels
are influenced by various factors, not all of which work in the same
direction. Various incentives and disincentives, constraints and
heuristics or biases influence the way in which policy mechanisms are
developed, or the ways in which people behave in response to policy
interventions. Some of these factors are unique to one level and some
apply to many (e.g. lack of information, rigidity, dispersed power).
It is our contention that the development and deployment of
policy interventions are influenced by various institutional,
organizational, human psychological and behavioral, economic and
political biases or heuristics. These influences become encoded in the
decision-making mechanisms themselves, which in turn, push those
who are subject to the interventions to behave or react in ways that
mirror the biases or heuristics or the designers of the interventions
themselves.
The cyber security field is in constant flux, and issues related
to decision-making are inherently multidisciplinary, which
necessitates timely, ongoing and integrated research to keep our
societies as productive and secure as possible. In listing the factors
that influence decision-making, we draw on the disciplines of
international relations, economics, organizational behavior, cognitive
and behavioral sciences, psychology and public policy.
How then can we make better decisions in cyber security
policy? Section one provides an overview of the obstacles to effective
decision-making in cyber security policy at the international, national,
organizational and individual levels. A number of interventions might
be instituted to try to begin to overcome the various factors that
negatively influence decision-making in cyber security policy. In the
third section, we propose some specific examples linked to the
systemic factors we identify as influencing decision-making in section
two. The last section offers a research agenda designed to support the
development of the proposed interventions we discuss in section 3.
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SECTION 2

This section provides an overview of the obstacles to more
coherent and coordinated cyber security policy across levels
(international, national, organizational and individual) by discussing
issues within each level, describing what has been done in the past
and in some cases describing the past limitations to success.
A. International
1. Lack of Institutional Architecture to Deal with Non-State Actors.
Within international relations theory, the realist school of
thought characterizes the international system as anarchic. It is one in
which individual states each act in their own self-interest, unable to
cooperate out of mistrust of one other. The international system is
one comprising Westphalian nation states. This model has prevailed
since the treaty for which the system owes its name in 1648. The
liberal school of international relations theory called for the creation
of a set of international organizations and norms to manage the
relations between states in this otherwise anarchic international
system.
The Internet, as a network of networks, is not bound strictly
by national boundaries in law or in practice, since communication
across borders in this system is constant. Cyber-security thus presents
a problem that an international system comprised of nation states is
ill equipped to solve. So-called ‘non-state’ actors fill the ecology of
cyber-security, from private companies that develop the software and
hardware, private Internet service providers, organized criminal
outlets and individual ‘hackers’, not to mention both business and
personal users of the Internet. While there is some interaction
between state and non-state entities, such as relationships between
Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies with organized
criminal groups,1 and between the Chinese military and semiautonomous hacking groups, these non-state interests are not present
1

See BRIAN KREBS, SPAM NATION (Sourcebooks, Inc., 2014).
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within the delegations representing the respective nation states in
international organizations and fora.
A patchwork of international agreements and treaties are
linked to cyber-security.2 One multilateral agreement, drafted under
the aegis of the Council of Europe, is The Budapest Convention on
Cyber Crime. Signed in 2001, it is open to non-European signatories
and has the objective of pursuing, “a common criminal policy aimed
at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting
appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation.”3 The
Budapest Convention has attracted 50 signatories. However, it is still
criticized as being outdated and has not gained the support of key
countries in cyber security such as Brazil and Russia.4
On a bilateral level, a number of recent agreements have been
created with the intention of curbing cyber-espionage between the
United States and China,5 between China and the United Kingdom, 6
China and Germany7 and between China and Russia.8 Questions have
been raised as to whether or not the bilateral agreements, particularly
2 See Jonathan Clough, The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime: Is
Harmonisation Achievable in a Digital World?, MONASH U. (July 30, 2013),
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/2013isoc/presentations/clough.pdf.
3 See Council of Europe (COE), CONVENTION ON CYBERCRIME,
(Nov. 23, 2001), https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Displ
ayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680081561 (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
4 Brian Harley, A Global Convention on Cybercrime?, COLUM. SCI & TECH. L.
REV. (Mar. 23, 2010), http://stlr.org/2010/03/23/a-global-convention-oncybercrime/.
5 Colin Lecher, US Reaches Economic Cybersecurity Agreement with China, THE
VERGE (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/9/25/9399187/obamachina-cyber-security-agreement.
6 Danielle Correa, China and the UK Sign Cyber-Security Agreement, SC MAG.,
(Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.scmagazineuk.com/china-and-the-uk-sign-cybersecurity-agreement/article/448578/.
7 Kevin Sawyer, Germany and China Reach Agreement to End Commercial
Cyberwar, NAT’L MONITOR (Oct. 29, 2015), http://natmonitor.com/2015/10/29/
germany-and-china-reach-agreement-to-end-commercial-cyberwar/.
8 Lee Munson, Russia and China Sign Cyber Security Pact, Vow Not to Hack
Each Other, NAKED SECURITY (May 11, 2015), https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2
015/05/11/russia-and-china-sign-cyber-security-pact-vow-not-to-hack-eachother/.
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the one between the United States and China, can actually be
enforced and thus will achieve their stated goals. Moreover, the
agreements leave out other vital organizations such as civil society
organizations, critical infrastructure, and the government, military,
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations of the respective
countries.9
Finally, attempts have been made to include ‘Internet-based
surveillance systems’ in the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral
agreement on export controls for conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies. The proposals to extend the Wassenaar
Arrangement have been criticized on the basis that, in the long run, it
would undermine cyber-security by criminalizing the very security
research activities that result in the identification and correction of
vulnerabilities in software and hardware.
2. Diffusion of Power.
One of the megatrends identified by the National Intelligence
Council in its report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, is the
increasing diffusion of power globally. 10 In this increasingly
multipolar world, power shifts to networks and coalitions made up of
non-state actors such as private enterprises and individual threat
actors such as hackers. Ironically, this diffusion and dispersion of
power is partly driven by vast improvements in communication
technologies. These conditions make it difficult to implement and
enforce international agreements even when there is general
consensus and agreement on a specific cyber security policy at the
international level.
“Who do I call if I want to call Europe”, is a quote
commonly misattributed to Henry Kissinger in reference to the
difficulty in international relations and negotiations when dealing
Richard Bejtlich, To hack, or not to hack?, BROOKINGS (Sept. 28, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/09/28/to-hack-or-not-to-hack/.
10 See
Generally Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE COUNS. (Dec. 2012), https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/
organization/global-trends-2030.
9
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with a dispersed entity that has no single representative. The quote
nicely encapsulates the current problem facing cyber security policy at
an international level between nation states: there is simply no one
body or entity to call or to convene major stakeholders to address
cyber security threats or challenges.
The international diplomatic system has trouble integrating
the views of entities outside of the Westphalian system of nation
states. The Internet is a decentralized network of networks that
involves privately owned entities in almost all countries. In this
aspect, the Internet’s greatest strength inherently incorporates its
greatest weakness; designed to survive a nuclear conflict, redundancy
is baked into its very structure but at the expense of the ability for
central administration. As with the nation state system itself, there is
no central controlling actor or actors capable of forcing compliance
on all participants. International negotiations require the participation
of these private entities, yet the international system is not built to
incorporate such actors, and so remains unable to include them in
ways essential to the success of any treaty in this domain. And yet
without the inclusion of such groups and individuals, any
international agreement is doomed to failure from the outset.
In fact, this diffusion of nation state power is compounded
by the very ‘empowerment of the individual’ that the Internet itself
facilitates. This term refers to the way that digital technologies invert
traditional power dynamics. Now individuals, with very few
resources, are able to influence the actions and behavior of
governmental or multinational organizations many times their own
size. Suicide bombers provide a dramatic example of this
phenomenon. The influence of individual non-state actors is
particularly relevant in cyber security. Many of the threat actors in
this field are organized criminal outfits, in many cases backed
explicitly or tolerated by the state in which they reside. Widespread
availability and adoption of commercially available information
communication technologies grants individuals capabilities to access
and amplify information previously only available to nation states.
And destructive effects are not limited only to organized groups, but
can reside within the reach of individual hackers themselves as well.
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Effectively controlling such a system through a slow moving
and rigid set of decision-making rules, procedures and processes,
such as those that characterize the international system, is an
immensely difficult task. Even were binding agreements to be
reached, actual implementation of these agreements presents a whole
new set of difficulties. And enforcement proves harder still, especially
in the fast-moving technological landscape. These is a deep and
persistent, perhaps unfathomable breach, between the speed of
government and bureaucratic action, and that of technological
innovation. In such a contest, technology is bound to circumvent
particular restrictions long before those constraints can be
implemented. And this is likely to be true for the foreseeable future.
B. National
In organizations there are at least four reasons why planners
tend to fail when attempting to address complex problems. 11 First,
people tend to oversimplify the process of problem solving to save
time and energy.12 Second, people are overconfident in their own
abilities, and thus try to repeat past successes.13 Third, people have
trouble quickly absorbing and retaining the large amounts of
information necessary to understand dynamic, ever-changing
processes.14 Finally, people tend to focus on immediately pressing
problems at the expense of considering longer term or more distant
challenges or the unintended consequences and problems that
solutions can create.15
These four characteristics of poor decision-making help us
understand why the current approach to cyber security policy making
at a national and organizational level is failing.

11 See DIETRICH DÖRNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND
AVOIDING ERROR IN COMPLEX SITUATIONS (Basic Books 1989).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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1. No National Strategy.
In the United States, there is no national strategy and no
long-term strategy for cyber security policy. This creates a vacuum of
responsibility and an absence of direction and constraint which leads
to contradictory policy. This inevitably generates the emergence of
turf wars over the rapidly expanding Federal funds available for
programs nominally meant for ‘cyber’ purposes, but often directed
toward other only tangentially related interventions by agencies which
seek to co-opt these funds for other purposes.
This is not a new problem, nor one restricted solely to the
domain of ‘cyber’ for that matter. In 2013, the Government
Accountability Office released a report entitled, ‘National Strategy,
Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better Defined and More Effectively
Implemented’.16 Specific problems identified with the cyber security
policy approach include: few milestones or performance measures in
government strategy documents; the assignment of high-level roles
and responsibilities but important operational details being left
unclear; and wide variance across cyber security strategy documents
in terms of priorities and structure, how they link to or supersede
other documents, and how they fit into an overarching national cyber
security strategy.17 Little has changed to improve these deficits in the
intervening years.
The Department of Defense’s Cyber Strategy, perhaps the
longest standing national strategy document, provides a set of
strategic goals but lacks fine-grained, operational details that are
publicly available.18 The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative was released in 2013 and came with 12 initiatives but did
not come with an operational plan on how these initiatives should be

16 U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO-13-187,
CYBERSECURITY: NATIONAL STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO
BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED (2013).
17 Id.
18 The DOD Cyber Strategy, THE DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 2015),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/2015/0415_cyberstrategy/Final_2015_DoD_CYBER_STRATEGY_for_web.pdf.
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implemented and operationalized.19 The Cybersecurity National
Action Plan came with a set of actions, like setting up a Commission
on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, and creating a Federal Chief
Information Security Officer position, and allocated $19 billion in
funds across a plethora of activities, but did not include tangible
outcomes and metrics for determining cost effectiveness or ‘success’.
This is a combination tailor-made for inciting misuse of government
funds.
The responsibilities for portions of cyber security policy are
spread out across dozens of Federal agencies, the Department of
Defense and intelligence community, regulators and other ancillary
bodies (like Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, or ISACs).
This dispersed responsibility, coupled with no overarching strategy,
creates situations where agencies pursue cyber security policy goals
that match their organization’s interests but, in many cases, contradict
the cyber security concerns of other organizations, sectors, and
people, or produce unnecessary, wasteful, or even deleterious
redundancies, often even without awareness of such duplication.
Lack of fully transparent communication between these divisions
within the government serves to further complicate problems
associated with disaggregated policy planning and implementation.
A recent example is the push by FBI Director Comey for
laws that would mandate backdoors to be placed in encryption
standards. Were this policy to be successfully implemented, it would
have the effect of weakening overall cyber security (including the
cyber security of other government agencies), not to mention the
ability of foreign actors to access sensitive American materials.
Another example is the National Security Agency, which has
a dual mission that in practice is contradictory. The Signals
Intelligence mission requires that the agency acquire the
communications of foreign governments (espionage). The second
mission of the NSA, the Information Assurance mission, tasks the
agency with safeguarding the information of government agencies,
The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, EXECUTIVE OFF. OF
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files
/cybersecurity.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
19

THE
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corporations and individuals in the U.S. The approach is summarized
as ‘keep our information safe, get theirs.’
The Signals Intelligence mission requires that key information
technology infrastructure, hardware and software, be weakened and
exploited. These technologies, in many cases are the same ones used
by government agencies, corporations and individuals in the United
States itself. The weakening of these technologies puts these entities
in the U.S. at risk (the revelation in 2016 of back-doored Juniper
routers, which are used by many U.S. Federal government
departments, is a case in point). Add to this the fact that US Cyber
Command, which is the military’s designated organization for
safeguarding its networks and information, is led by the same person
that leads the NSA, and we have a muddled set of responsibilities
with little coordination.
C. Organizational
1. Lack of Evidence Base.
Evidence-based policy making is an approach where policy
decisions are based on the collection and interpretation of objective
evidence relating to the policy issue at hand and the performance of
the policy option implemented. Its intellectual roots lie in evidencebased medicine, where randomized controlled trials are used to assess
the policies or treatments that contribute most toward the resolution
of a particular condition or ailment. This etiology embodies an
important corrective; fixing one problem in the human body often
causes another because systems are enmeshed in ways that are not
always obvious, clear or systematic. Similarly, in a network design like
the Internet, focusing on simple, easy-to-measure outcomes can
quickly become a version of the drunkard’s search. Just as lowering
cholesterol does little to change overall risk of coronary artery
disease, although the ability to do so with statins makes billions for
Big Pharma every year, reducing the number of hacks may not
necessarily mean the overall system is safer. After all, body counts in
Vietnam did little to provide an accurate indicator of how well the
United States was doing in that war. Effective decision-making in
43
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complex environments requires knowledge about the structure of a
system and the outcomes of the decisions made in relation to the
goals that are being pursued.20 Without this knowledge, an
organization may implement interventions that ultimately exacerbate
the very problems that it seeks to mitigate.
In cyber security policy, there is a dearth of reliable, verifiable
data on the financial scale of the losses, the sources of threats and
risks, and the potential positive and negative impacts of policy
decisions. While figures on the number of cyber incidents are
released annually by the Computer Emergency Response Team (USCERT), such figures are methodologically questionable – for instance
- much of the increasing incidence figures could be chalked up to
better detection methods and companies have incentives to hide
serious breaches - and thus give very little in the way of policyrelevant guidance.
Where there are metrics available, there is no guarantee that
they will be actionable, relevant or useful. For instance, since 2003
the Department of Homeland Security has been operating an
intrusion detection system, formerly called the National
Cybersecurity Protection System, now called the EINSTEIN
program. 2122 After over a decade of operation, and $6 billion in
investment, “none [of the metrics developed by DHS] provide
insight into the value derived from the functions of the system.”23 An
estimated $19 billion was allocated to cyber security measures in the
2017 White House budget proposal, representing a 35% increase
See DÖRNER, supra note 11.
It is of great concern therefore that the Cybersecurity National Action
Plan calls for the Department of Homeland Security to enhance Federal
cybersecurity, “by expanding the EINSTEIN and Continuous Diagnostics and
Mitigation programs”.
22 Aliya Sternstein, US Homeland Security’s $6B Firewall Has More Than a
Few
Frightening
Blind
Spots,
DEFENSE
ONE
(Jan.
29
2016),
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/us-homeland-securitys-6bfirewall-has-more-few-frightening-blind-spots/125528/.
23 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-294, INFORMATION
SECURITY: NHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE PLANNING, AND
SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION
SYSTEM (2016).
20
21
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over the previous year.24 However, it was not clear where all these
funds were going because there was no definition for what actually
constitutes a ‘cyber security program’.25 Even data on research and
development (R&D) spending on cyber security, the release of which
is required by law, have only been made available as recently as
2013.26
The lack of reliable evidence is due to a number of reasons.
There are strong incentives for corporations and government
agencies not to disclose whether an information security failure has
occurred, facilitated in part by patchy data breach notification laws,
which are set at a state level in the United States, and differ
substantially in their requirements. Companies may not want
competitors to know their weaknesses, and corporations as well as
the government may not want the public to lose faith that their
personal financial, medical, or social information is safe when they
interact with them. This of course assumes that the company is aware
of a failure in information security having even taken place, which is
far from guaranteed.
Where there are data and studies available, the most
commonly cited data sources are compiled by security or antivirus
vendors, who have business incentives to magnify the problem, or
are in studies undertaken by academic institutions or think tanks and
sponsored by corporations that operate in the field. These studies
make unrealistic assumptions about the behavioral responses of
companies, and do not take into account the unobserved differences
among companies in the datasets. They assume that all companies
react in the same way to information security incidents regardless of
industry, size (whether by headcount or annual revenues), business
model or current revenues, costs or profitability. In reality, the losses
24 The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, THE WHITE HOUSE: OFF. OF
MGMT. AND BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget (last visited
Sept. 26, 2016).
25 Middle Class Economics: Cybersecurity, THE WHITE HOUSE: THE
PRESIDENT’S
BUDGET,
FISCAL
YEAR
2016
(Aug.
7,
2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact
_sheets/cybersecurity-updated.pdf.
26 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
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that a company might face from a security breach are influenced by
the individual company’s fragility, which in turn is a function of a
number of firm-level characteristics including customer loyalty, profit
margins or debt. For a hypothetical example, if a company with low
profit margins, low customer loyalty and high debt is subject to a
costly data breach, and that information becomes public, the periodic
drop in revenues and curtailed access to short-term debt might
render the company insolvent. This would not be the case for a
company with high margins, high customer loyalty and low debt. Yet
many studies treat all companies as if they were identical when
predicting or forecasting potential impacts of a breach.
Selection bias is also endemic. The only companies that
appear in malware or data breach incident datasets are those that: a)
detected the incident; b) subsequently reported the incident; and c)
were able to accurately quantify the impact of the incident. Of the
entire universe of companies, only a fraction of a fraction is likely to
be included in this analysis. Simple methodological problems like
ensuring a representative sample are endemic in commonly used, selfreported surveys. The total losses across countries are often based on
extrapolations for entire populations; multiplying the average loss per
company by the total companies in the country or economy may not
provide the most accurate estimate of actual breaches or losses.27
This lack of evidence means that cyber security policy makers
cannot determine where the true problems lies and where policy
interventions might have the greatest benefit given their costs, nor
can they track the subsequent outcomes of the policy interventions
that they make. This failure then compounds over years as successful
policy interventions aren’t identifiable and failed policy interventions
are allowed to persist in spite of their failure.
With no basis on which to evaluate the need for and
effectiveness of cyber security policy, there is a risk that the system
becomes nothing more than a ‘self-licking ice cream cone’: A self-

Dinei Florencio & Cormac Herley, Sex, Lies and Cyber-crime Surveys
(Microsoft Research, Working Paper), available at https://www.microsoft.com/enus/research/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SexLiesandCybercrimeSurveys.pdf.
27
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perpetuating process that is meant to address a problem but instead
contributes to the very problem that it is ostensibly designed to solve.
2. Chronic Lack of Technical Knowledge.
The chronic lack of technical knowledge and talent within the
organizations with responsibility for cyber security policy severely
hampers these organizations’ ability to effectively develop and
implement policies. This technical knowledge gap can be attributed
to there being no standard way in which to classify or keep track of
cyber security related roles, and to the inability of Federal agencies to
retain and develop what technical talent they are able to hire.
Again, this problem is not new. In 2011, the Government
Accountability Office released a report titled ‘Cybersecurity Human
Capital: Initiatives need Better Planning and Coordination’, flagging that,
“eight agencies with the biggest IT [information technology] budgets
have trouble handling their cybersecurity workforces and determining
their composition and responsibilities.”28 It remains a persistent
problem. In a 2013 report, the GAO wrote that, “only 2 of 8 agencies
it reviewed developed cyber workforce plans and only 3 of the 8
agencies had a department-wide training program for their
cybersecurity workforce.”29 The Department of Defense was the only
agency to report their shortage to the GAO in 2011 (as they were the
only ones who had a methodology in place).
This has not stopped government agencies from announcing
large hiring targets, complete with large budgets, to hire cyber
security personnel. The Department of Defense announced that it
would have 6,000 ‘cyber-warriors’ by 2016 but there is little indication
of where these people would come from (much less what a ‘cyber-

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-8, CYBERSECURITY
HUMAN CAPITAL: INITIATIVES NEED BETTER PLANNING AND COORDINATION
(2011).
29 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
28
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warrior’ does). The Office of Personnel Management was also
competing to hire 1,000 cyber security personnel in this market.30
The Department of Homeland Security is the private sector’s
liaison on cyber security matters – it also advises other agencies on
the issue. The GAO identified 1,361 cyber security personnel at DHS
in their 2013 study. One official is quoted as saying, “the National
Cyber Security Division has had trouble finding personnel for certain
specialized areas, such as watch officers”. 31 This division has a central
role in operating important interventions such as the EINSTEIN
system, developing the National Cyber Incident Response Plan, and
operating the National Cybersecurity Center.
The lack of any data to measure the problem or outcomes of
policies to address the problem makes achieving strategic goals, like
Initiative #8 of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, which
calls to, “develop a technologically-skilled and cyber-savvy workforce
and an effective pipeline of future employees,” even more
challenging.
Another underlying reason for the chronic lack of technically
skilled people in government is that government can rarely compete
with the private sector in the IT arena in terms of salary, stock
options, prestige and other remunerations. Few career public servants
have an advanced understanding of technical issues in the area of
cyber security, and even fewer private sector IT professionals have
any understanding of, much less interest in, the processes underlying
the formulation of government policy. At a cultural or ideological
level, many of those who work in or are a part of the tech industry
either in Silicon Valley or more generally have a Libertarian or
Randian bent. They are broadly skeptical of and distrust
government, 32 exacerbating the conflict between government and
industry in the surveillance versus privacy debate around cyber
security goals. Even if the government could compete head-to-head
GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFF., https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/FR-2015-11-10/html/2015-28566.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016).
31 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 16.
32 A compact summary of this set of values can be found in Richard
Barbrook and Andy Cameron’s 1995 essay ‘The Californian Ideology’.
30
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in pay, it would still have to overcome the ideological forces that
dissuade Silicon Valley from collaborating openly with government.
The security and screening requirements for many positions
related to cyber security in the Federal government have created
obstacles to hiring talent as well. One example is Ashkan Soltani,
who was in line to work with the White House’s Office of Science
and Technology Policy after a stint as the Federal Trade
Commission’s Chief Technologist, but whose security clearance
application was rejected possibly due to past affiliation with Edward
Snowden. 33 In another example from 2014, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that the agency was
considering relaxing its policy, which prohibited hiring anyone who
had used cannabis in the past three years, because it was so difficult
to find candidates for cyber security roles who would pass the
policy’s requirements.34
Simultaneously, private entities with the skill base to address
some of these challenges technologically have no ostensible reason to
include policy experts on their design teams. Government does not
mandate or regulate such participants, and there is little or no support
or infrastructure in most technology companies for their
contribution. On the other side of the equation, it is hard enough for
the government agencies to find people to manage and secure their
internal information technology networks, let alone find those with
the technical knowledge and skills coupled with an understanding of
public policy formulation and implementation. Both sides are thus
confronted with enormous challenges to achieving mutual
understanding and translation of basic needs and goals.
Finally, government organizations typically set their cyber
security policy internally as a list of compliance-based check boxes
that the system administrators are expected to rigidly follow. These
33 Danny Yadron, White House denies clearance to tech researcher with links to
Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technolo
gy/2016/jan/29/white-house-tech-researcher-denied-security-clearance-edwardsnowden-nsa.
34 Leo Kelion, FBI ‘could hire hackers on cannabis’ to fight cybercrime, BBC
NEWS (May 22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-27499595.
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check box lists are developed from the perspective of the defender,
not the adversary, so they are typically circumvented by highly
resourced and sentient adversaries. Their ‘one size fits all’ approach
emphasizes attaining compliance over actually directing resources
towards areas where dynamic risks are greatest for the organization in
question.
The management of government agencies also does not
permit the system administrators who manage their IT networks the
autonomy necessary to take a proactive approach to system security.
These rigid policies are the equivalent of handcuffing the security
guard at the front of the building and then telling him/her to keep
the place safe from thieves. A long-term effect is that, rather than
empowering the system administrators to proactively address cyber
security concerns, this approach drives out the most talented
technical employees, thereby compounding the already acute skills
shortage in Federal agencies.
D. Individual
1. Heuristics and Biases.
Clearly many challenges confront our ability to formulate
effective cyber-security policy. Not least among these are systematic
and predictable barriers which exist in the minds of individual
decision makers and other stake-holders. A few of these merit some
comment, specifically roadblocks related to loss aversion and the
difficulties of making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.
These proclivities can induce a kind of paralysis because people find
themselves averse not only to change, but especially to risks and
threats that incorporate some element of uncertainty.
Loss aversion constitutes a well-known phenomenon first
experimentally documented in the work of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky.35 This work elegantly demonstrated human hedonic
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA: J. OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOC’Y 263, 26135
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asymmetry. In short, people are more averse to loss than they are
attracted to an equal gain. So, for example, it hurts more to lose $10
than it makes most people happy to win $10. In fact, people need to
be offered about $25 on average to make them indifferent between a
bet which can lead to a loss of $10. In other words, most people need
two and a half times more potential benefit in order to take the risk
of a potential loss. This phenomenon in and of itself can, of course,
lead to a particular kind of paralysis since it embodies an inherent
status quo bias. People will of course seek out uncomplicated gains,
but if a path also poses a risk, people will, on average, show a
relatively high degree of loss aversion.
There is, however, one important consistent exception, as
described in Prospect Theory. 36 When people are operating in a socalled domain of losses, when things are bad and look to be getting
worse, people become much more prone to taking risks, including
quite dramatic ones, in order to recoup previous losses, and return to
the former status quo position.
There are a couple of important caveats in this work. Most
relevant, people will show the opposite tendency, meaning risk
aversion in the domain of losses, when probabilities are low. This
explains, for example, the almost universal acceptance of insurance
whereby people pay a sure cost to avoid the very small probability of
a larger loss. But note there that these assessments of likelihood
typically result from subjective assessments and not necessarily
objective probability, meaning that people can often misjudge how
likely a given event may be. This would certainly be especially likely in
a domain such as cyber-security where the base rate of risk is largely
unknown as we noted above. While it makes sense that any given
company or entity may want to keep successful attacks secret, this
lack of transparency makes it much more difficult for the overall
community to accurately assess the objective threat and share
important information on successful defensive strategies. This
secrecy works to the attackers’ advantage. Greater dissemination of
accurate information about kinds and types of attack, even within
91 (1979); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 341-50 (1984).
36 Id.
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closed networks, might allow for the development of more effective
counter-strategies, or even more effective insurance policies to
amortize risk across the broader system, even if such allocation were
restricted to specific sectors or industries.
In policy terms, this translates into some potentially
destructive consequences. In short, people are more likely to take
risks that could make things worse precisely when they are already in
bad circumstances. This can easily snowball to make things a lot
worse very quickly. These are the times when caution might be most
warranted, but is also less likely, particularly in an environment
permeated by a sense of crisis, time pressure or high stakes. Thus,
policy makers may prove loath to develop policies to implement if
disaster strikes when things are going well, for fear of offending
potential allies and donors, because of distraction from more pressing
problems at any given moment, or due to general status quo malaise.
However, once a crisis hits, pressure mounts, and that sense of threat
and risk is precisely what throws decision makers into a domain of
loss where the potential for optimal decision making is restricted, and
in the absence of well-developed and rehearsed standard operating
procedures, catastrophic losses become much more likely to occur
simply as a result of momentum. Under such conditions of attack,
risk acceptance dominates, especially because the crisis itself shifts
leaders’ perceptions regarding the probability of subsequent attack.
This entire process may characterize decision-making in any
number of domains but becomes exacerbated by the uncertainty that
typically permeates cyber-attacks in particular. Decision making
under uncertainty often proves difficult. In general, such decisions,
particularly when time is of the essence, are dominated by a series of
so-called judgmental heuristics37 which provide useful rules of thumb
for filling in the blanks when objective probabilities remain unknown.
Their exact operation remains outside the purview of this discussion
and can be found elsewhere.38 For our purposes, suffice it to say that
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-31 (1974).
38 See ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
PROSPECT THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (University of Michigan Press,
1998) (discussing an application to political science).
37
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uncertainty, like risk, can systematically restrict optimal decision
making by encouraging individual leaders to revert to established
psychological strategies and procedures in decision making that may
not be well suited for the given problems or challenges they confront.
Recall that such biases evolved precisely because in most
circumstances they offer fast and easy and largely accurate responses
to the world; in other words, they developed precisely because, on
average, they allow largely accurate estimates in the absence of
objective information at the lowest cognitive cost. However, it is
precisely in novel or unusual circumstances, such as those often
posed by cyber-security challenges, where we might expect the
systematic operation of such biases to induce predictable biases
leading to sub-optimal results.
However, this need not necessarily be the case. Sometimes,
embracing the wisdom of uncertainty can precipitate unexpected
creativity in decision-making. Admittedly, this is most likely when the
decision-making milieu is not riven by time pressures, which is why
systematic planning prior to crisis becomes essential to avoid the
more negative consequences of psychological bias in decision
making. Conversely, when planning can take place at a time of
relative security, the acceptance of uncertainty can help generate
unexpected solutions and opportunities because individuals come to
see that the standard operating procedures do not properly address
new challenges which exist in domains divergent from those areas
which the original procedures were designed to address. For example,
standard operating procedures designed to respond to a military
assault on a physical location will not offer much guidance when the
attack occurs in virtual space, however real the financial, logistical or
operational consequences of cyber breaches. Therefore, it is precisely
the inherent uncertainty of the new environment that offers the
possibility for new and creative responses, but these are only likely to
emerge under conditions of calm, not under circumstances defined
by threat and the risk, where loss aversion will dominate, and risky
choices become more likely.
Thus, it becomes easy to see how the same pattern of
unproductive and unresponsive decision-making recurs. When the
problem is not salient, it is easier not to do anything, but under
53
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conditions of threat, risky choices predominate, which may not
necessarily help future outcomes. As Einstein said, the definition of
insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a
different result. However, if we change the approach, and embrace
the creative possibilities present under conditions of uncertainty in
times of calm, it may then become possible to harness human
psychological tendencies in our own favor to develop more creative
solutions to novel problems.
III.

SECTION 3

A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power
and Non-State Actors
The international system has to adapt to a world that is vastly
different from that which it was built to manage. Effective cyber
security policy development and implementation at an international
level will require bringing nation states together with private
companies,
the
technical
community,
non-governmental
organizations, and individual hackers. Faced with diffused power
across many linked entities, decision-making structures and processes
themselves have to be more adaptable, flexible, bottom-up, and
resilient. As with many contemporary global challenges, there is a
need for governance mechanisms unlike those that were used to
govern the more kinetic international challenges, which dominated
international relations prior-to and during the 20th century.
A number of international organizations are attempting to
take responsibility for various aspects of cyber security policy at the
international level. For example, in 2014, the United Nation’s
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) called for,
“Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in
the use of information and communication technologies.”39 The

International Telecommunications Union [ITU] (2014), Resolution 140
rev Busan 2014: Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security
in
the
use
of
information
and
communication
technologies,
39
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ITU membership brings together governments and the private sector
(including Sector Members, Associates and Academia) to forge
agreements on radio communications standards and increasing
development through greater access to information and
communication technologies (ICTs).
The problem for organizations such as the United Nations
and other international fora is that they either do not or can only
partially include the diverse state and non-state stakeholders that
comprise the cyber security field. In addition, their typical programs
of work have timelines that span many years. In the time it takes to
complete one cycle, a field like cyber security usually moved on to
new and more pressing issues.
One model worth examining more closely is the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF), which has done a good job over the
past two decades providing a forum in which technical experts and
organizations can come together to make decisions relating to the
technical architecture on which the Internet operates. This process
has been effective because of its open format – anyone can join the
meetings – its rough consensus system for reaching agreement, and
the Request for Proposal system, which ensures that all participants
have an opportunity to make proposals and then debate these
proposals. These characteristics have resulted in technically robust
and agreed upon technical standards and outcomes for the Internet.
B. National – A National Cyber Security Plan
Following Dörner’s original findings, addressing complex
problems requires the establishment of an overall plan with clear
goals, a ‘systems level’ understanding of the environment in which
the plan will be executed, and iterative revision of the plan in
response to information updates on the state of play. Components of
a coherent plan to guide cyber security policy at a national level
include a long-term strategy with clear goals, milestones, performance
targets, resources, and responsibilities.
https://www.itu.int/en/action/cybersecurity/Documents/Resolutions/pp14_Res. 130.pdf (last visited March 7, 2016).
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For the first time, as a follow-up to the 30-day ‘cyber sprint’,40
an operational plan was released on October 30, 2015 to upgrade
Federal cyber security in the United States. The White House
Cybersecurity Strategy and Implementation Plan (CSIP) was intended, “to
identify and address critical cyber security gaps and emerging
priorities, and make specific recommendations to address those gaps
and priorities.”41 It had 5 overarching objectives:
•

Prioritized identification and protection of high value
information and assets;

•

Timely detection of and rapid response to cyber
incidents;

•

Rapid recovery from incidents when they occur and
accelerated adoption of lessons learned from the Sprint
assessment;

•

Recruitment and retention of the most highly-qualified
cyber security workforce talent the Federal Government
can bring to bear; and

•

Efficient and effective acquisition and deployment of
existing and emerging technology.

40 After realizing that over 14 million personnel records had been stolen
from the U.S. government Office of Personnel Management, a 30 day
‘cybersecurity sprint’ was announced. The goal was to take, “number of steps to
further protect Federal information and assets and improve the resilience of
Federal networks”. In tangible terms, some steps included the patching of critical
vulnerabilities, acceleration of the implementation of multi-factor authentication,
and tightening of policies and practices for privileged users. Progress reports were
required after 30 days (The White House, 2015c). What’s extraordinary is that, after
tens of billions of dollars in prior investment, these basic steps had not yet been
implemented.
41 Memorandum from The Executive Office of the President to Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies (Oct. 30, 2015), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2016/m-1604.pdf.
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Each of these 5 objectives was given a set of concrete goals
linked to the achievement of the objectives. Its timeline clearly laid
out the steps that had to be taken, and allocated responsibility to the
respective organizations in order to achieve the stated objectives
before September 2016.
This plan was a major first step in a very narrow part of the
U.S. Federal Government’s efforts to implement basic cyber-security
measures among selected Federal departments. This approach should
be replicated to cover cyber-security policy nationally for the public
and private sectors.
As a part of the development of this plan, a clearer and less
contradictory allocation of authority and responsibilities for key
portions of cyber security policy is required. The announcement of a
Chief Information Security Officer, who focuses on coordinating
cyber security across federal agencies, and is housed within the Office
of Management and Budget at the White House, is a promising first
step in this direction. 42
However, the announcement of the possibility that the
Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance responsibilities within
NSA may be merged, two functions that are in practice contradictory,
was a possible step in the wrong direction. 43 A far better alternative
would have been to allocate the Signals Intelligence mission to the
NSA, the government and military Information Assurance mission to
US Cyber Command (which would have to be led by a different
person than the head of the NSA), and the private sector
Information Assurance mission allocated to where it resides at
present with the Department of Homeland Security (with the Chief
Information Security Officer potentially playing an oversight or
coordination role). Such an arrangement would have avoided the
42 Danny Yadron, White House seeks its first ever chief information officer, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb
/09/white-house-seeks-first-chief-information-security-officer-hackerscybersecurity-hacking.
43 Danny Yadron, NSA merging anti-hacker team that fixes security holes with
one that uses them, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/feb/03/nsa-hacker-cybersecurity-intelligence.
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prior conflict of interest by separating the offensive capabilities, by
housing them in the Department of Defense, from the defensive
capabilities, by housing them in the Department of Homeland
Security.
C. Organizational
1. Improving the Evidence Base.
More robust evidence would contribute greatly to better
cyber security policy and filling the chronic lack of technical
knowledge that has emerged in Federal agencies. Creating a
mechanism where private companies are required to report breaches
while ensuring the secrecy of such information might go far toward
creating a more comprehensive data base, while assuring such firms
that their leaks would not risk unnecessary public distrust or the
exposure of proprietary code or information.
There needs to be standard definitions for what cyber security
budget spending actually constitutes and agreed measures for the
results or outcomes of these budget items. This is necessary so that
money nominally allocated to ‘cyber security’ is not used for other
purposes merely because its meaning can be easily morphed; the
result of a policy produced through such aggregation would be haphazard at best, lacking integration and overall strategy. This is akin to
asking for the input and output measures for cyber security policies.
With these measures in hand, the outcomes of cyber security policy
interventions can be evaluated.
Of all fields, development economics might have tools for
potential use in testing cyber security policy interventions. For
instance, the logical framework approach (log-frames) has been used
for decades to design interventions in many complex fields (e.g.
agriculture, education, health) by identifying goals, tying actions to
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those goals, and then evaluating the intervention according to preestablished metrics.44
Borrowing from the medical field, development economics
and development aid organizations have some well-developed tools
and principles for the monitoring and evaluation of interventions in
complex systems.45 Participants are randomly allocated to one of two
groups, only one of these groups is given the intervention, and then
the differences between the groups post-intervention are measured
so as to determine its effectiveness or efficiency. However, as with
the human body, the Internet is a large network, meaning that
changes in one place may affect other parts of the system in
unintended or unanticipated ways, and attention to such feedback
loops remains an important part of not making things worse by
providing a series of bandages that do nothing to stop the bleeding
(or to prevent later problems such as infections).
Lessons from this field could be drawn and deployed to give
cyber security policy makers a toolkit with which to classify their
budget items in a consistent way (the inputs). This then allows
measures of the effects of these policies across metrics like the
number of breaches per year, or the proportion of designated highvalue information that is encrypted, or any measure that is deemed
appropriate (the outputs) to be developed, and used to adjust,
eliminate or add various program elements to improve performance.
2. Specialized Track for Technical Talent.
To improve the level of technical talent in cyber security roles
within government agencies, a specialized track for this talent –
44 See D. McLean, The Logical Framework In Research Planning And Evaluation
1-11 (ISNAR, Working Paper No. 12, 1988); see also Guidance on using the revised
Logical
Framework,
DEPARTMENT FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan.
2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/253889/using-revised-logical-framework-external.pdf.
45 See Esther Duflo & Michael Kremer, Use of Randomization in the
Evaluation of Development Effectiveness, http://economics.mit.edu/files/2785 (last
visited Sept. 27, 2016); see also Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental
Approach to Development Economics, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 151, 151-78 (2009).
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subject to different working conditions and hiring requirements than
typical positions – is one avenue worth exploring. Indeed, as part of
the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP), a $62 million
educational fund was created, “for Americans who wish to obtain
cybersecurity education and serve their country in the civilian Federal
government.”46 This was an extension of the already-established
National Science Foundation’s and Department of Homeland
Security’s CyberCorps Scholarship for Service program and a sort of
Reserve Officer Training Corps program for new cyber security
talent.47 Such a program provides long term benefits to recipients as
well as government agencies as a larger pool of experts is recruited
and cultivated.
Other existing initiatives might provide lessons for this or
other special training initiatives. One might be the US Digital Services
(USDS), which was originally modeled on the United Kingdom’s
Government Digital Service. The USDS is housed within The White
House Office of Management and Budget that brings technical,
policy and legal professionals and places them in Federal agencies
where technical talent is lacking. They take a human centered design
approach to the use of technology to make government departments
more responsive and accessible to people. They have projects
running in areas that have been deemed priorities by the Obama
administration including Veteran’s Affairs, Department of Homeland
Security (linked to immigration, not cyber security), Social Security
and the IRS. Their annual budget is partially covered by Congress
and partly comes from the partner agencies where their members
work.
Another model that might be worth emulating is the
Jefferson Science Fellowship Program. This program has existed
since 2003 and allows tenured, or similarly ranked, academic
scientists, engineers and physicians from U.S. institutions of higher
learning to spend one year in Washington D.C. at the U.S.
The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2017, supra note 24.
See Sean Gallagher, Obama wants you to join CyberCorps Reserve to help feds
get their act together, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 9, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/02/obama-wants-you-join-the-cybercorps-reserve-to-help-feds-gettheir-act-together/.
46
47
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Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID). A similar program might be developed for
cyber security talent, in U.S. higher education establishments or even
private sector companies (given that some of the best talent resides in
the financial sector), to do a yearlong service in government agencies
where their technical talent or specialized knowledge could be used to
improve the organization’s cyber security or strategy in this area.
Such a program might also potentiate important and on-going social
networks between government and technical experts, and allow each
to achieve a greater understanding of the other’s needs, incentives,
goals and constraints.
Each of these programs may not be able to compete
financially with the private section, but by harnessing existing talent,
supporting emerging talent, and trying to attach service and prestige
to government work, such strategies can help to improve the current
reservoir of skill within existing agencies.
D. Individual
Of course, the structural incentives identified can be shifted
through organizational changes to induce greater compliance and
attention to issues surrounding cyber security, including enhanced
transparency and improved integration and communication across
agencies tasked with different but overlapping goals. But ultimately
the causal agents within any organization are individuals who remain
subject to the inherent psychological biases we discussed above.
1. Transparently Structured Choices and Consequences.
It is not easy, but there are some standard ways to reduce
individual’s susceptibility to such biases.48 First among these is simply
to make people aware of the unconscious biases that may affect their
judgment and decision-making. The simplest way to do this is not
through complicated, time-consuming, expensive training programs
during which people zone out. Rather, the idea is to make sure that
48

See supra note 35, at Id.
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choices are structured in a transparent way so that such biases
become evident. For example, in the classic experiment where people
had to make real life choices between radiation and surgery for
cancer, options were presented with “mortality” and “survival”
statistics side by side. When this is done, the equivalency of the
options becomes immediately evident, but the psychological pull
across framing also remains obvious. In a similar manner, choices
between options in response to a particular threat should present
both the costs and benefits of options side by side, not only for the
relevant choices, as is often typically done, but also relative to the
status quo (i.e. doing nothing) option so that costs and consequences
of inaction become as immediately salient as those associated with
any given course of action.
Because people are preternaturally preoccupied with loss, it is
important to find ways to convey not only probabilities, but also help
people to better understand how to psychologically calibrate the
meaning of abstract probabilities. The human mind does not do well
with very large numbers; we are all aware of the phenomenon of
“crisis fatigue” whereby one dead boy on a beach is a tragedy but
hundreds of thousands of refugees pouring into Europe from Syria is
an immigration challenge that provokes border controls and political
hostility.
These numeracy challenges can play out in myriad ways. One
of the best ways to help decision makers contemplate very large data
breaches is to encourage strategies or procedures for transforming
such issues into very direct and small scale terms. Human psychology
is much better suited for solving smaller scale problems; it is much
easier for people to get a handle on and contemplate how to respond
in a constructive way to challenges that are framed in local terms. So,
for example, we can worry about threats to the electrical grid but the
initial policy problem that needs to be solved and addressed might be
better facilitated if it was framed in terms of how to get electricity
back up in Washington, D.C. without cyber capacity, and then scale
up from these more local decisions to national policy plans.
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2. Training through Gaming and other Table-Top Simulations for
Emotion Regulation.
Importantly, as much as the Western canon has taught
professionals to privilege rationality over emotion, rationality as
posited by economists in particular is little more than an intellectual
construct completely devoid of psychological reality. Psychological
rationality is deeply emotional by design; the human mind privileges
emotional information since that is what has been key to survival in
the face of myriad threats over millennial time. This means that
people are exquisitely sensitive to emotional inputs, perhaps overly so
in modern contexts, but as with loss aversion, we are more attentive
to negative emotions such as fear and anger than more positive ones
such as hope and joy.
Negative emotions, while important and useful for helping us
to properly allocate energy and attention, and also to consolidate
memory, can nonetheless encourage over-reactions to threats and
attacks, especially uncertain ones that pose an ambiguous or
uncertain risk. Encouraging training for emotion regulation would be
time and money well spent to reduce the risk of over-reaction to
uncertain or threatening stimuli. Enormous amounts of evidence
now exist documenting the benefits of mindfulness based stress
reduction strategies in achieving such goals.49
Moreover, this is a domain in which gaming and other tabletop simulations positing different kinds of threats and crises could
prove helpful in giving people an engaging, even fun, way to gain
practice, experience and knowledge about potential response options
to any given scenario. Such strategies also work to build a sense of
community and camaraderie among those who would have to work
together in a real crisis. In this way, issues of dominance,
specialization of labor and other issues which can interfere with
effective, time-sensitive responses, can be negotiated prior to the
actual crisis, so that when real challenges emerge, team coordination
and cooperation can be as smooth as might reasonably be expected.

See P.R. Goldin & J.J. Gross, Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR) on emotion regulation in social anxiety disorder, 10 EMOTION 83, 83-91 (2010).
49
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SECTION 4

Research will be required to translate many of the proposals
made in the section above into the cyber security policy field. This
section outlines a research agenda that is intended to provide some
guidance on the kinds of research questions that might profitably be
pursued and the research methods that might help yield useful
answers.
A. Developing Governance Models that Manage to Diffuse Power
and Non-State Actors
An examination of governance models that have either been
designed to coordinate diffuse entities, or that have proven to be
successful in coordinating diffuse entities, would be a useful step
forward in determining a global governance model for cyber security
policy. This paper has already mentioned the IETF as a model that
has proven successful in the past for managing technical matters
related to the Internet globally.
Perhaps there are lessons to be drawn from global
governance models in other areas of public health policy, such as the
World Health Organization and the Centers for Disease Control, or
in conflict mitigation and resource sharing, such as the Arctic
Council, or in the establishment of international law, such as the
United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea?
A comparative examination of these varied arrangements
would look at the types of parties involved, the mechanisms by which
decisions are made and consensus is achieved, the cost of setting up
and maintaining the mechanism (and by whom this cost is borne), the
success of the mechanism in achieving its stated objectives, and the
reasons for failure should failure be experienced.
One of the challenges with devising a new set of governance
strategies with the flexibility and adaptivity that would allow both
state and non-state actors, including businesses, to engage is that the
Internet itself, as a network of networks, and the World Wide Web,
run contrary to most established forms of government structure,
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which are hierarchical in nature. While originally hailed as a
mechanism to survive and enhance resilience in the case of nuclear
war, and later as a means by to encourage and facilitate greater
democratic involvement, the Internet also provides a platform where
individuals with very few resources can exert almost unprecedented
damage and destruction. This structure challenges those who wish to
provide an interface between hierarchical and horizontal governance
structures to offer a different kind of structure.
One kind of structure that might potentially be considered
involves the notion of panarchy as developed by Buzz Holling and
colleagues50 in their work on environmental sustainability. This work
developed out of examining how systems in nature achieve balance
across large systems over time. In this concept, three factors of
capacity, connectedness and resilience emerge most prominent.
The Internet itself offers almost limitless potential for
connectedness and great potential for resilience, but this framework
raises stark concern about the relative capacity of predator and prey.
However, this is where another biological model might prove useful
and instructive. Well-established equations such as the LotkaVolterra51 which characterizes the predator-prey dynamic would allow
similar mathematical modeling of the dynamic interaction between
hackers, governments and the businesses who try to survive and
thrive in cyber space. Although originally developed in a biological
context to represent the impact of disease and competition among
animals as a function of numbers, time and rates of interaction to
measure prospects for survival or extinction, it has long been used in

C.S. Holling, Understanding the complexity of economic, ecological, and social
systems, 4 Ecosystems 390, 390-405 (2001); Brian Walker et al., Resilience, adaptability
and transformability in social-ecological systems, 9 Ecology and Soc’y (2004).
51 A.J. Lotka, Contribution to the Theory of Periodic Reaction, 14 J. OF
PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 271, 271-74 (1910); A.J. Lotka, Analytical Note on Certain
Rhythmic Relations in Organic Systems, 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.
OF THE U.S. 410, 410-15 (1920); A.J. LOTKA, ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL BIOLOGY,
71-274 (Williams and Wilkins, 1925); VITO VOLTERRA, VARIATIONS AND
FLUCTUATIONS OF THE NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN ANIMAL SPECIES LIVING
TOGETHER (R.N. Chapman ed., 1931).
50
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economics to model interaction of sectors in industries as well,52 and
could readily be adapted for use in the context of cyber competition.
It has more recently been used successfully to characterize the
maintenance of cultures of honor in environments with aggressive
actors and weak institutions, a condition not unlike the current state
of Internet governance.
This model offers important insight because although it
makes a number of important simplifying assumptions, it also
highlights how the evolution of predator and prey influence each
other. In an evolutionary context, predators select for characteristics
that will enhance their ability to find and capture prey, just as prey
select for traits that increase their ability to hide, escape or otherwise
evade predation. These selection features influence the oscillation
dynamics of each side in the equation, precipitating cycles of
dominance, but because the goals of predator and prey are
antagonistic, the selection of mutually antipathetic characteristics
profoundly affects the dynamics of their interaction as well as
prospects for survival. These biological models, which exist in welldeveloped differential equations, and have already been used to
positive effect in economics, offer concrete ways to examine the
interaction between hackers and defenders, regardless of which sides
governments or businesses may be on.
B. A National Cyber Security Plan
The first step in developing a national cyber security plan
requires examining what has been done in other countries in the past,
as well as seeking to develop innovative solutions for our own
particular needs and goals. To date, there is limited comparative
literature on the national cyber security plans deployed in countries
such as Singapore’s 5 year National Cyber Security Masterplan, the
United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Strategy, and Canada’s
Cyber Security Strategy, among many others.

R.M. Goodwin, A Growth Cycle, in SOCIALISM, CAPITALISM
ECONOMIC GROWTH (C.H. Feinstein ed., 1967).
52

66

AND

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Dean & McDermott

5:1

Comparing the success of other country’s plans - which have
clear goals, action plans, metrics for success, timelines and
responsible agencies - would allow for a comprehensive plan to be
written in the United States that learns from the successes and
failures of others (rather than repeating any recognized mistakes).
C. Specialized Track for Technical Talent
The first step in considering new policy proposals should be a
pre-feasibility study based on cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit
analysis would look at the financial cost, both to the host
organization that would pay for the awardee’s stipend, and to the
organization from which the awardee is seconded. It then becomes
possible to compare this dollar amount to the benefits that would
accrue to the host organization and to the alternative policy option of
training or hiring talent from scratch. If the costs outweigh the
benefits by a certain ratio, then this policy option may not be worth
pursuing.
The point of comparing this specialized track to training or
hiring from scratch is important. The major strength of creating a
specialized track for bringing technical talent into government for the
short-term, vis-à-vis the current approach, which is epitomized by
proposals to hire 6,000 ‘cyber warriors’ into DoD or 1,000 new
personnel into OPM, is that it is will not run into the practical
resource constraints that are going to face these other proposals
(namely: that there simply aren’t enough qualified people in work
force to hire at this level for the medium-term). Indeed, a costbenefit analysis will likely find that the cost effectiveness of a
specialized track is many times less than the alternative, which would
have the added benefit of freeing up funds to be used for other
initiatives with the goal of bolstering cyber security.
D. Improving the Evidence Base
Compiling transparent, reliable, and statistically rigorous
cyber security statistics would contribute to better decisions in cyber
security policy. The problem to date has been that this responsibility
67

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

has been taken on either by organizations with a stake in stoking
greater fears about cyber security (e.g. anti-virus companies and
private security vendors) or with organizations that lack the requisite
statistical capacity to provide reliable data (e.g. the FBI’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center).
This is typical practice in the U.S., where statistics are
compiled by organizations responsible for the regulation of the sector
or administration of the sector (e.g. the Federal Aviation Authority
compiles aviation data, similarly the National Center for Health
Statistics operates under the Centers for Disease Control). Assigning
a disinterested party with sufficient statistical capacity and credibility
to provide an independent assessment of the scale of the problem
could prove very helpful for beginning to design programs to help
address these issues. Could the National Institute for Standards and
Technology play a role, either as a convener or as an authority to
grant some authority to cyber security data?
When randomized control trials were applied from medicine
to the development economics field in the late 1990s, there was a
need to develop a specialized methodology to respond to the unique
logistical and ethical issues that arise in international development
work. Adjustments to randomized control trial methodologies will
likewise have to be made to adapt them to the unique characteristics
of cyber security.
For instance, it isn’t clear how comparable control and
treatment groups might be identified or separated when so many
network elements differ across organizations (indeed, even within
organization the elements are likely to differ). The rate at which the
technology changes and software is patched might also make it
difficult to keep the two groups separate and, within the groups,
maintain consistency across subjects (then again, many organizations
run on legacy systems that are 10 years old, so this might not be such
a great obstacle depending on the organization). This might imply
that the studies might only be able to be conducted at the
organization-level, though we simply don’t know yet.
An assessment of the costs of running an experiment would
be useful. The costs of randomized control trials in cyber security
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may not be cost-effective. The up-front costs to actually run the
experiments may not be overwhelming, especially considering the
multi-billion dollar budgets being allocated at a national level, but the
cost associated with the losses to the control group may accrue over
time and offset the potential gains from the experiment (then again,
given that attackers only need to infiltrate one out of potentially
thousands of users to compromise a system, perhaps the risk levels
remain the same whether undertaking an experiment or not, although
the cost may not).
A taxonomy of cyber security ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ would
also have to be developed in order to undertake an experiment.
Accurate measures for the effects of treatment would also need to be
developed and established. The goal would be to determine which
metrics exist and can be reliably measured, or which ones might have
to be created, in order to measure effectively the various policy
interventions that could be made to reduce certain cyber security
risks.
E. Developing Gaming and Other Table-Top Simulations
There is a long and established body of work on gaming and
table-top simulations for crisis situations, even in cyber security.
Indeed, a recommendation during a panel on mitigating cyber
security threats at a recent conference at Columbia University was
that, “simulations, war/business games, and table-top exercises can
provide additional venues for information sharing and help build
trust between participants, which can be helpful in crisis
situations.”53
Indeed, this is where using the intrinsic strengths of the
industry itself may be able to potentiate innovative methods for
training and testing; the use of simulations can prove enormously
helpful by providing a way to control for many elements while
Proceedings of the Conference on Internet Governance and Cyber Security,
COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L AND PUB. AFF. (May 14, 2015),
https://sipa.columbia.edu/system/files/Proceedings_ColumbiaSIPA_InternetGov
erance_Cybersecurity_Conference2015.pdf.
53

69

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:1

varying one, and being able to do so across many diverse elements
quickly, either simultaneously or sequentially. Once problematic areas
are identified using this strategy, more elaborate real time
experiments can be conducted manipulating potentially problematic
aspects. Any such simulations could be easily conducted using
existing Internet based platforms which allow for multi-user
simultaneous interaction.
Where new research might be especially useful is in the
development of methods that combine psychological training and
emotion regulation training with simulations. The idea would be to
run through the several stages that comprise risk-based approaches to
cyber security, such as the NIST Risk Management Framework, so as
to identify where the failure to successfully implement the framework
occurs due to panic or individual biases and heuristics, and then
address these sources of failure.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have described the factors that we believe influence
decision making in the area of cyber security across four main levels
of analysis: international; national; organizational; and individual.
Each poses unique challenges to the development of a coherent and
consistent policy of cyber security.
After describing what has been done to enhance cyber
security at each level, and noting the challenges that remain, we have
suggested some important ways in which policy and research might
advance policy in more productive ways. These include: establishing a
coherent national plan with clear and coherent benchmarks and
policies and plans for implementation and accountability; the
conscious development of different governance structures for
regulating the Internet internationally; creating a national service
action plan for recruiting and circulating cyber talent in and out of
government; providing a more accurate evidence base of past
experience to improve future response; and establishing regular
games and simulations to train people in how to respond to differing
potential threats.
70

DOCUMENT5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2017

4/27/2017

Dean & McDermott

5:1

Enhancing cyber security is a critically important project. It
also appears an overwhelming one on which we have made less
progress than those who seek to exploit the systems in question. In
developing systems designed more for overall resiliency than security,
the architects of the Internet never imagined the widespread use it
would achieve. However, this resilience has also resulted in
vulnerabilities that now need to be addressed. It will require a great
deal of coordinated action on the part of many individuals, users,
industry and government actors to improve cyber security without
compromising privacy unduly. Working diligently and creatively to
achieve such a goal will help make everyone safer and more
productive.
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